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Abstract—To realise the broad vision of pervasive computing,
underpinned by the “Internet of Things” (IoT), it is essential to
break down application and technology-based silos and support
broad connectivity and data sharing; the cloud being a natural
enabler. Work in IoT tends towards the subsystem, often focusing
on particular technical concerns or application domains, before
offloading data to the cloud. As such, there has been little regard
given to the security, privacy and personal safety risks that arise
beyond these subsystems; that is, from the wide-scale, cross-
platform openness that cloud services bring to IoT.
In this paper we focus on security considerations for IoT from
the perspectives of cloud tenants, end-users and cloud providers,
in the context of wide-scale IoT proliferation, working across
the range of IoT technologies (be they things or entire IoT
subsystems). Our contribution is to analyse the current state of
cloud-supported IoT to make explicit the security considerations
that require further work.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decades of the twentieth century there was
much research into sensor and communications technologies.
At that time, sensor-based systems tended to be developed in
“silos”, being localised, application- and technology-specific.
It became evident that sensor data could potentially be used for
many diverse purposes if a means of sharing could be devised.
The term “Internet of Things” (IoT), first coined in 1999 by
Ashton at MIT,1 came to be used to capture this aspiration:
(1) based on ever-wider connectivity of sensor/actuator-based
systems, more general data sharing would become possible
than within the specific applications for which those sensor/
actuating systems were developed, (2) computers would be-
come autonomous, able to collect data and take decisions based
on them, without human intervention. Moreover IoT represents
a broader move to the vision of pervasive or ubiquitous
computing [1].
Recently, the IoT concept has captured imaginations within
government and commerce, as a technology capable of sup-
porting immense growth [2], [3]. However, systems aiming at
this wider vision are in their infancy. Sensor/actuator-based
systems have been developed independently of the IoT vision
of open data sharing. It is crucial that the security, privacy and
personal safety risks arising from open access to data, across
and beyond these systems, are evaluated and addressed.
IoT potentially covers a wide range of applications, in-
cluding smart home systems, smart street lighting, traffic
1http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986, (Accessed Apr 2015).
Fig. 1. An illustration of IoT including cloud services (IoT-Cloud).
congestion detection and control, noise monitoring, city-wide
waste management, real time vehicle networks and smart
city frameworks [4]. At the individual level, personal health
and lifestyle monitoring are being integrated with general
healthcare services [5]. Such application scenarios tend to be
sensor/actuator-based, each developed for a single purpose. In
contrast, the IoT philosophy is the wide-scale integration of
potentially all technology; including individual devices, appli-
cations, servers, and so forth, in addition to sensors/actuators.
That is, the data from a range of different sources are capable
of diverse potential application and should be developed with
broad usage and wide availability in mind.
The cloud is an obvious technology for achieving this open
sharing. Cloud computing has evolved to manage, process, and
store big data, that, for example, has arisen from services
such as search engines. Data analytics became an essential
complement to cloud-hosted web services. Similar services can
be used for large-scale data from IoT systems (including those
that are mobile), making them independently shareable and
widely available.
The cloud is an ideal component in an IoT architecture.
Firstly, because cloud services can operate across a range of
systems, services, and devices, it provides the natural point for
(1) data aggregation and analysis, and (2) the management,
control and coordination of the range of systems and services.
Further, (3) cloud services offer benefits in terms of resource
management, as clouds are always on, can scale to meet de-
mand, and can allow the offloading from constrained hardware
of data (for computation [6] and storage) and management
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specifics. In this paper we use IoT-Cloud to refer to IoT
architecture that incorporates cloud services. Fig. 1 illustrates
a variety of IoT applications, supported by cloud services.
Any closed subsystem (see xII-B), e.g. which might repre-
sent a low-level sensor network, or a group of devices behind a
firewall/access-point is assumed to have a gateway (a.k.a. edge-
server or hub). The support for connectivity and open sharing
via cloud services allows, for example, emergency services to
interact with traffic control, power (utility) providers, home
monitoring, the ambulance service and hospitals, as appropri-
ate. A traveller might find out about a new city environment
with a mobile phone interface. An IoT architecture allows
different applications to be built using the same set of sensors,
actuators and devices.
Many IoT-enabled services are developed with a single
application in mind, with little consideration of security issues
beyond local concerns, e.g. security might exist within a sensor
network, but not when data is passed outside. Further, IoT
applications are linked to the physical world, and can directly
influence and change it. For example, Leverett [7] discusses
systems that were believed to be within a secured network
but were in fact directly accessible through the Internet. They
were often poorly protected e.g. through a simple password
scheme, or sometimes not at all. Ventilation and temperature
management systems for hospitals were compromised, putting
patients’ lives at risk, through error or deliberate attack.
As the number of connected devices increases and their
usage becomes an important part of everyday life, security,
privacy and personal safety issues will arise.
Security concerns are already seen to inhibit the uptake of
cloud services, especially by public bodies with responsibility
for sensitive data, such as healthcare services [8]. Similar
concerns arise for IoT-Cloud, exacerbated by the sheer scale of
IoT. As the number of sources/sinks increases, managing and
securing these appropriately becomes a challenge. Privacy is
also a real concern—personal data could be collected from a
wide range of sources. Benign sources and “anonymised” data
may reveal little in isolation, but combining data from a num-
ber of sources can result in privacy-invading inference [9]—a
wider challenge for IoT is a fuller awareness of the possible
consequences of open connectivity.
This paper focuses on the security considerations for IoT-
Cloud, given that cloud services act as ‘glue’ that can integrate
and mediate ‘things’, as well as provide data processing,
storage and management for individual ‘things’. In this context,
we analyse the current state of cloud service offerings for IoT
and consider their security provision from the perspectives of
cloud tenants, end-users and cloud providers, focusing on the
interplay between them.
The core contribution of this paper is to identify a range
of security concerns specific to IoT’s use of cloud services:
we present 20 key security considerations for IoT-Cloud. Each
section operates to encapsulate a number of considerations,
which are summarised in Table I at the end of the paper.
We first consider issues accessing the cloud (xIII), exploring
issues of secure transport (1) and cloud access controls (2),
before considering the range of data management concerns in
xIV, 3 to 8. We then discuss issues of identity management
(xV, 9 and 10) followed by the issues of scale (xVI, 11 and 12)
that are inherent to IoT-Cloud. Dealing with malicious ‘things’
and associated attacks is explored in xVII, 13 and 14. The
focus then turns to the integrity of cloud services, considering
certification and trustworthiness (xVIII, 15 and 16), and related
issues of compliance, transparency and responsibility in xIX,
17 to 19. Finally, in xX we survey the emerging directions in
cloud computing, including fog, edge and decentralised clouds,
and examine the associated IoT security concerns (20).
xXI summarises the considerations in Table I with respect
to the “CIA” security properties (Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability), in each case indicating where ‘off-the-shelf’
security mechanisms can be used (green), where additional
but tractable work is needed (amber) and where significant
research is required (red).
We now begin by providing background and establishing the
context for these considerations.
II. ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW: CLOUDS AND THINGS
A. Cloud Computing Terminology
Advances in networking, bandwidth, resource management
and virtualisation technologies have resulted in service mod-
els that involve provisioning computing-as-a-service. Cloud
computing, “the cloud”, involves cloud service providers
(providers): those offering the service, provisioning and man-
aging a set of technical resources, among tenants: those
consuming the cloud services through direct relationships
with providers. The providers’ business model is generally
to leverage economies of scale by sharing resources between
tenants, while tenants gain from being able to pay only for the
resources they require, thus removing a costly start-up base
and being able to acquire service elasticity—to rapidly scale
up and/or scale down resources in response to fluctuations in
demand—and more generally, improving access to storage and
computational services. The end-user of a system may interact
with a cloud provider either directly or indirectly via tenant-
provided services.
Specific application servicesecific a licati  ser ices
Specific languages and servicesS ecific la g ages a  services
Specific libraries and runtime services
Middleware: Inter-process communication
Operating System
ecific li raries a  r ti e ser ices
i le are: I ter- r cess c icati
erati  ste
Hypervisor: Supports VMs and possibly VM IPCer is r: rts s a  ssi l   I
Security
 Management
Monitoring
Accounting
Audit
…
c rit
 t
it ri
cc ti
it
Hardware: data center facilities (machines, disks, network)ar are: ata ce ter facilities ( ac i es, is s, et r )
IaaS Tenants
PaaS Tenants
SaaS Tenants
Fig. 2. Cloud service provision architectural overview [10]. For each service
model, a tenant is provided all that below the blue line.
Cloud service offerings are generally divided into three main
categories: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a
Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS) as shown
in Fig. 2. In IaaS, the cloud service provider is responsible
for the management of the network, hardware and hypervisor.
PaaS service providers offer, in addition, the managed OS
and application environment. SaaS service providers manage
everything on behalf of the tenants, including the application.
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There are other categories emerging, including Network as
a Service, Brokers as a Service, Sensors as a Service, etc.,
though most of these focus on offering a particular component
in service composition, rather than a larger scale platform.
Another common division of cloud systems is private and
public. Public clouds are the most common, where the cloud
provider shares resources (hardware or perhaps software such
as databases) between tenants. Virtual machines (VMs) or
containers are used to ensure a separation between tenants
and their resources. The public cloud brings benefits in terms
of economies of scale, and is of most interest and with
most potential, moving forward. In a private cloud model,
the tenant is offered a dedicated (unshared) set of resources.
This is analogous to ‘in-house’ management, giving the tenant
greater control and an increased sense of security. Hybrid
clouds bridge the two, where some resources (e.g. potentially
sensitive data) might be processed in a private cloud, others
on the public cloud. Data and processing may be transferred
between the two, when and where appropriate, e.g. for scaling,
analytics, etc.
For example, in the UK there is a National Cancer Registra-
tion Service (NCRS)2 that holds cancer-related health records
in a private datacenter to comply with national regulations
on safeguarding patient confidentiality. Patients can see their
own data, but only through a public web portal. The NCRS
makes datasets available for medical research, but given the
sensitive, personal nature of the data, it must be anonymised
before leaving the private cloud. Strong audit is required to
manage the anonymisation and data migration processes.
B. IoT-Cloud Components
The term the ‘Internet of Things’ is broad, often used
in a number of technical contexts to focus on very specific
concerns, such as wireless (radio) communication aspects,
sensor-networks, machine-to-machine (M2M) communication,
human/environmental and technical interactions, and so forth.
For the purposes of this paper, we consider IoT in terms of
supporting the wider vision of pervasive/ubiquitous computing,
whereby the whole range of sensors, devices, applications,
systems, servers, clouds (i.e. anything) has the potential to
interact in order to realise some functionality.3
We refer to IoT subsystems in order to represent a closed
and/or self-contained network of ‘things’. These subsystems
generally have a gateway component (a.k.a. hub or edge-
server) with the functionality of masking heterogeneity and
controlling the data flowing in/out, and in some cases, me-
diating the ‘things’. Subsystems may be application-centric
networks, either fixed or rapidly instantiated and/or temporary
(ad-hoc) in nature, e.g. supporting a smart home, emergency
services during a catastrophe; or those comprising a particular
technology domain (ecosystem), such as a proprietary sensor
network, or control system in an industrial assembly line.
To facilitate a wide-ranging discussion, in this paper we
consider a ‘thing’ as any entity, physical or virtual, capable of
2http://www.ncr.nhs.uk, (Accessed Apr 2015).
3Of course, this is only the potential. There are practical limits in terms of
application/network boundaries, economic and ownership considerations, etc.
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Fig. 3. An illustration of the interactions within an IoT-Cloud.
interaction (data exchange) [11]. Our focus is particularly on
‘things’ interacting with cloud services. Some ‘things’ will be
individual items such as IP-enabled video cameras, fridges,
etc. A subsystem is also considered a ‘thing’, because the
cloud provider sees and interacts (only) with the subnetwork’s
gateway component; the gateway represents the end-point of
the cloud interaction, mediating between the subsystem and the
cloud. In line with this definition, it is possible that a single
device could be considered, from the cloud perspective, as
several ‘things’. For example, a smartphone has the potential
to host a range of different applications, each of which
are capable of direct cloud interaction, but these would act
(separately) as gateways for the data collected by the phone’s
sensors. Fig. 3 depicts the interaction of clouds and ‘things’,
including those through IoT subsystems.
As introduced in xI, ‘things’ are typically developed for
particular applications, or within technical domains (in terms
of radio, communication protocols, APIs, etc.) Therefore, in
practice most of the security engineering focus is on protection
against specific, targeted attacks; with little consideration given
to security issues beyond these domains. However, harnessing
the full potential of IoT involves using/reusing system com-
ponents, when and where appropriate, to realise new, possibly
previously unforeseen functionality and services. Hence, this
paper focuses on a (mostly overlooked) area by considering
security with respect to the interplay of ‘things’ and their
interactions with cloud services.
C. Leveraging the Cloud for IoT-Cloud
In the introduction we presented a historical IoT perspective,
where various communication and lower-level sensor manage-
ment networks were developed for specific purposes. Early
work in such areas often mentioned offloading computing or
data onto a ‘server’. Moving forward, we saw ‘server’ being
replaced by ‘cloud’, and we now see many IoT solutions as
tightly integrated with cloud services. For instance, a recent
survey showed that among the 38 IoT platforms surveyed, 33
relied on cloud or other centralised services [12].
There are good reasons for using cloud services to support
IoT. In terms of general resourcing:
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 Cloud services are ‘always on’, and globally accessible,
so ‘things’ can be located anywhere, be mobile, can
transmit different data at different times.
 Cloud services are built to scale rapidly, which ideally
suits IoT in which many ‘things’ can communicate at
different data rates, at different times.
 They help manage resource constraints. Many ‘things’
will be limited in terms of computational power, battery,
storage capacity, etc. The ability to shift some of this
load to the cloud helps to alleviate these limitations.
Further, cloud services can easily operate across a range
of ‘things’. Cloud services can be used to mediate between
different ‘things’, to enable 1) wide-ranging data sharing, and
2) to manage and control a range of different ‘things’ as
appropriate. Therefore, using the cloud to support IoT naturally
provides cross-thing management. It enables data and control
flows (e.g. coordination policy) to move horizontally, working
across a wide-range of ‘things’. This is crucial to the wider
vision of IoT, enabling pervasive computing more generally.
Indeed, this leads to ‘big data’-proper, by providing the means
for personalisation, customisation and automated/intelligent
actions across a range of different applications, ‘things’, and
physical environments [13].
1) IoT-Cloud Interactions: We are primarily concerned with
the interactions between ‘things’ and the cloud, see Fig. 3.
The cloud provider offers services and infrastructure for
data storage, computation, etc. The service model could be
IaaS, PaaS or SaaS, depending on the specific service offerings
and requirements. For IaaS or PaaS services, tenants might
be applications serving a number of different ‘things’, and
therefore end-users might also be tenants, e.g. for a user’s
“quantified self” data. The particular service model is often
not directly relevant to the considerations we explore.
As discussed above, in order to leverage the full power of the
IoT, we need the possibility for data to be shared across a range
of applications, i.e. horizontally, between ‘things’. This has not
been the vision of many existing IoT systems, developed as
one-off services in a closed and/or limited application space
(i.e. a vertical silo). Nor was inter-application sharing the
vision of cloud service providers; strong isolation between
applications was their prime concern, achieved through tenant
isolation technologies (e.g. VMs and containers).
A motivating example representative of the wider vision is
the concept of a smart city, where data is generated on local
weather conditions, car park occupancy, traffic congestion, bus
location, pollution, building usage, etc. The vision is for this
wide range of data to be made available, via cloud-hosted
platforms, for services (public or private) to be built on top. For
this, data will need to be shared, and analytics operate over a
range of data sources, repositories and ‘things’. For instance,
there may be services that analyse data in combination and
issue emergency alerts, e.g. when weather conditions are
extreme and/or traffic is congested, and emergency services
must be routed to an accident. We discuss this further in xIV
2) Scope of IoT-Cloud Security Considerations: Security
remains an ongoing challenge for systems generally. Indeed,
there are many problems to be solved in the IoT world [14]—
i.e. within the IoT subsystems that we have mentioned—
including network protocols, radio management, standardiza-
tion, internal security and privacy [15]. Similarly, there are
ongoing security issues for cloud services [16], many of which
are concerned with provider trust.
The focus of this paper differs as it specifically explores se-
curity at the level where ‘things’ and the cloud interact. We do
not consider lower-level, subsystem-specific security aspects/
attacks, and further, only consider general cloud security issues
when relevant to the IoT-Cloud. Through the rest of the paper
we introduce security considerations that should be taken into
account when cloud services are integrated with IoT, and in
xXI highlight those considerations that require further research.
III. ACCESSING THE CLOUD
Communication underpins the interactions between ‘things’
and the cloud. There is a bi-directional flow of information.
Data might flow from ‘things’ to the cloud, perhaps for storage
or analytics. The cloud may also be the mediator and/or
conduit through which data (including actuating commands)
are sent to ‘things’. Much data will be sensitive, whether alone
or in aggregate. It is therefore important that communication is
secure, and user-access to cloud services is properly controlled.
Consideration 1: Secure communications. There are two
motivations for securing communication: 1) secrecy: prevent-
ing eavesdropping and data leakage, and 2) integrity: protect-
ing data from corruption/interference. Note that here we do
not consider communication within subsystems, but rather are
concerned with the interaction of ‘things’ with cloud services.
Communications Technology: Secure communication is re-
quired to prevent unauthorised access to data (or metadata)
that might be sensitive. Transport Layer Security (TLS) [17]
uses cryptography to establish a secure channel to protect
transmissions (including metadata such as protocol state, thus
limiting side-channels) from both eavesdropping and interfer-
ence. TLS employs a certificate-based model, relying on PKI
and certificate authorities for authentication.
TLS is a common feature of cloud-provider offerings, and
can be used to secure the confidentiality and integrity of
communications between ‘things’ and the cloud provider.
With a general view to making secure communication
more commonplace, there is recent work on enabling TLS
over protocol stacks other than TCP/IP to better suit the
requirements of ‘things’, in terms of complexity and resource
requirements. Examples include DTLS (Datagram Transport
Layer Security [18], [19]) for datagram oriented protocols such
as UDP, and LLCPS [20] that applies TLS over the Near
Field Communications LLCP (Logical Link Control Protocol).
Depending on the deployment, architecture and interfaces to
cloud services, these technologies could facilitate new forms
of secure ‘thing’-cloud interactions.
Apart from TLS there are, of course, other mechanisms of
securing ‘thing’-cloud communication. Data can be encrypted
by applications, which protects data not only in transit, but
also beyond. Sharing secrets naturally entails management and
engineering considerations [21]. We explore this aspect in
consideration 7.
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Aside from any vulnerabilities inherent in the approach, the
protection offered by any secure communication mechanism
is only as good as its implementation. For example, the recent
Heartbleed vulnerability in the widely-used OpenSSL library is
estimated to have left 24–55% of TLS/SSL protected endpoints
open to attack [22]. Extra care and consideration must be given
to the newer schemes and implementations currently being
developed to support IoT, especially those that may not have
been widely scrutinised or deployed.
Consideration 2: Access controls for IoT-Cloud. It is
important that (external) access to cloud resources is regulated.
Access controls [21] operate to govern the actions that may
be taken on objects, be they accessing particular data (a
file, record, data stream), issuing a query, performing some
computation, and so forth. Controls are typically principal
focused, in the sense that control policy governing a particular
action is defined to regulate those undertaking the action,
enforced when they attempt to take that action.
There are two aspects to access control: authentication
and authorisation. Authentication refers to verifying who a
principal is, i.e. are they who they say they are? Authorisation
rules follow authentication; once a principal is identified, what
are their rights and privileges; what actions are they authorised
to undertake?
In a general cloud context, the provider will offer access
controls to ensure that only the correct tenants/users (the
principals) access the appropriate data and services. Cloud
providers often have login/credential-based services for au-
thenticating tenants/users. Authorisation policy will be en-
forced as a principal attempts to take an action, based on their
level of privilege, which might allow them to access storage
and files held by the provider, initiate computation services,
etc. The precise controls will depend on the specific service
offering, but often include access control lists, role-based
access controls, capabilities etc. See [21] for an overview of
a number of security engineering techniques.
In an IoT context, a challenge for any access control regime
is accounting for the fact that the interactions between ‘things’
may involve encounters with ‘things’ never before seen, or
owned and operated by others. Towards this, Trusted Platform
Modules [23] offer promise by providing strong guarantees,
for example, with respect to device identity [24] and configu-
ration [25], which access control mechanisms can leverage.
IoT-Cloud poses extra challenges. The first concerns authen-
tication, given the size and scale of the IoT vision, correctly
identifying the ‘things’ and determining the relevant cloud
services/tenant applications is a real concern; xV is dedicated
to issues of identity. There are also difficulties in the fact
that infrastructure and data may be shared. Currently, cloud
policy is focused: authorisation rules are to ensure that a tenant
accesses only its own resources, i.e. their files, VMs, databases,
etc. However, for the IoT-Cloud, the lines are blurred. The
data and resources of a tenant may be relevant to a number
of different principals, and/or may control and coordinate a
number of ‘things’. Policy must be able to be consistently
defined and applied across both of these dimensions.
Access controls may be contextual, e.g. people may in
general only access data concerning themselves. In exceptional
circumstances, such as medical emergencies [26], wider ac-
cess may be desirable, as specified by “break-glass policies”.
Mechanisms are required to enable flexible access control
policies to be defined by different parties, while also being
able to identify and resolve potential policy conflicts. Such
concerns are non-trivial, and will likely require some external
constraints, such as ownership or economic incentives (e.g.
those paying for the service) to help make access control policy
more manageable.
Note that access controls govern the tenant/user$provider
interactions at the interface between them. These mechanisms
typically do not, by themselves, offer users control beyond
that point, e.g. how their data is managed internally by the
provider(s) (see consideration 6).
Controlling and coordinating ‘things’: The cloud will play a
role in mediating and coordinating ‘things’, where actuating
commands, the initiation/cessation of data flows, and so forth
will be initiated from the cloud. It is clear that ‘things’ will
need to maintain some form of access control, to prevent
potentially anyone from taking over. This is illustrated, for
example, by an access control vulnerability discovered in
a consumer lighting system, allowing an attacker to issue
lighting commands (causing blackout) by masquerading as a
user-device [27].
The role of the cloud as a mediator of ‘things’, brings
several considerations. First is that the access controls are not
necessarily symmetric, in that the process by which a ‘thing’
may access the cloud is not necessarily the same as how the
cloud can initiate access to the ‘thing’. Because there will be
far more ‘things’ than cloud services, there will likely also be a
far greater range of access control implementations, credential
services, etc., employed by ‘things’. The cloud provider must
be able to account for these. As such, standardisation is clearly
an important issue, and the role of gateway components will
assist in limiting the diversity.
Secondly, any cloud-based mediation and coordination will
be driven by policy components, many of which reside within
the cloud. To realise the wider IoT vision, policy enforcement
mechanisms must be sufficiently flexible to be defined across
the range of devices, while accounting for the differences
in access control models. That is, the cloud-deployed policy
enforcement components must be able to dynamically switch
between them to enable context-aware coordination when/
where appropriate, e.g. to adapt security levels based on a
perceived risk [28].
Care must also be taken to ensure that coordination policy
does not lead to further vulnerabilities—see consideration 18,
and [27] for a practical demonstration.
IV. DATA MANAGEMENT IN THE CLOUD
The IoT-Cloud is such that ‘things’ upload their data to the
cloud, and the provider then offers various storage, computa-
tional, or other services. In addition, the cloud is the natural
location for policy enforcement that has broader scope than a
single ‘thing’; in terms of affecting a range of ‘things’ or due
to external changes in context. The cloud provider becomes
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responsible,4 to some degree, for managing and acting on the
data it holds and processes, regardless of the service level
(IaaS, PaaS or SaaS).
We have considered the interactions between cloud services
and ‘things’, regarding secure data transmission, and how
access to resources can be regulated. We now explore security
considerations regarding data management within the cloud.
Consideration 3: Identifying sensitive data. In an IoT con-
text, it will often be the case that data is considered sensitive.
This is because data will encapsulate various aspects of the
physical environment, including highly personal information
about individuals, groups and companies, and can also have
physical consequences, e.g. actuating commands.
It is therefore important that security mechanisms are de-
signed to take account of the potential sensitivity of the data.
A recent example illustrating a failure of such involved a
baby monitor, where an (iOS) device on the local network
could listen in without being subjected to access controls [30].
Further, any device that had ever accessed the monitor could
then remotely listen in, anytime, anywhere. This represents a
clear failure to recognise and/or account for the sensitivity of
the audio feed.
Identifying the ‘thing’ that produces data may not always be
sufficient to determine how sensitive its data. For example, a
location sensor may be considered as generating sensitive data
when representing the movements of a particular person, but
the data produced by the same sensor may be less sensitive
when it is attached to freight in transit. Further, sometimes,
only specific items/data-instances are highly sensitive, even
when produced by the same ‘thing’, e.g. a facial recognition
device in a public space could provide the current location of
the Prime Minister, thus having national security implications.
Note also that the combination of data can raise the level of
sensitivity: we explore this in consideration 8.
Consideration 4: Cloud architectures: public, private or
hybrid? Where particularly sensitive, there may be decisions
to prevent data being placed on a public cloud [31], as is the
case for health records in general or some specific category
such as cancer records [32]. The type of cloud architecture is
relevant as it determines the ability for data and resources to
be shared.
Taking IoT and health records as an example: (1) health
monitoring data from IoT devices may augment health records;
(2) emergency detection based on multiple monitoring streams
(heart-rate, pulse rate, temperature, fall-detection) may need
an emergency response. The monitored streams may be sent
to care services such as ambulances and hospitals. Here, we
may have health records hosted in private clouds while IoT-
style health monitoring data and policy are hosted in public
clouds. A healthcare practitioner will need access to both.
However, this needs to be carefully regulated: ensuring the
practitioner may only access the clinical records (private cloud)
for patients they treat, and that the only monitoring data (public
4In a practical, technical enabling sense—their terms of service may
disclaim all liability [29].
cloud) accessible to the practitioner is that which the patient
has authorised, and may depend on the circumstances.
A research goal is to make public clouds sufficiently trust-
worthy, in order to meet the requirements of those, such as
health services and Government, that deal with particularly
sensitive data. Mechanisms providing strong data management
assurances and controls (which we explore below), enables a
wide range of new possibilities for applications and services.
In the meantime, however, the kind of scenario presented
above motivates hybrid-clouds, where tenants manage the
more sensitive aspects on their own (or dedicated) systems
under their control, using a cloud-compatible service stack to
integrate/interact with publicly accessible clouds. Clearly, the
hybrid cloud approach is rather blunt, as it entails physical
infrastructure partitioning, and thus can preclude the nuanced
sharing required by many application scenarios.
Consideration 5: In-cloud data protection. This concerns
the cloud provider protecting data within their service, by
preventing data leakage: (1) during transmission; (2) during
processing; (3) when data is stored “in the cloud”. In all cases,
data should not flow to unauthorised parties, including cloud-
insiders as well as cloud users.
With respect to communication, some cloud providers now
apply TLS internally within their infrastructure, including data
centres, to protect against any internal threats or security
breaches.5 This appears largely in response to recent highly-
publicised security breaches, such as those carried out by the
US National Security Agency.
The business model of cloud service provision is based on
economies of scale, through services that share resources. For
example, tenants may share the same physical machine by run-
ning above separate VMs during processing. Therefore, cloud
providers ensure strong isolation between cloud tenants/users
to prevent the leakage of data between them. This isolation can
occur at different levels, including the OS (containers) [33],
VM (hypervisor) [34], and in hardware (e.g. by leveraging
Intel’s proposed SGX CPU extensions [35]).
If storage is provided, depending on the level of isolation,
the service offering might implicitly segregate all resources
from others. Other levels of isolation may involve shared data
storage infrastructure and software, such as shared databases,
and thus rely on standard access control technologies (authen-
tication and authorisation)—see consideration 2.
Cloud providers invest significant resources into ensuring
strong access controls and complete isolation. Some are im-
portant for IoT-Cloud, as well as for cloud service provision in
general, but see consideration 6. Concerns over the extent of
provider access (by cloud insiders) do not only concern data
that can objectively be considered highly sensitive. Rather,
there may be laws that lead to particular data management
obligations. Or, simply, there may be little trust in the cloud
provider, e.g. if they reside in a jurisdiction that lacks a robust
data protection regime. In this case, the ‘thing’ may decide to
encrypt the data it uploads to the cloud, see consideration 7.
Consideration 6: In-cloud data sharing. We argued in xII
5For example, see http://wapo.st/1adFyAe, (Accessed Apr 2015).
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that the IoT vision entails data sharing, as required by appli-
cations and as controlled by their policy. Closed application
“silos” should no longer be the norm and data should be able
to flow as needed. For example, a heart-rate monitor and a
motion detector may be separate ‘things’ that upload their data
to the cloud. In one usage, each ‘thing’s’ data stream is stored
for the person being monitored, only accessible separately, and
isolated from other ‘things’ and other people’s data. But policy-
enforcing, management software for such medical applications
may also be cloud-hosted and may need to input and process
heart-rate, motion and other data to monitor patient wellbeing
and detect and respond to emergencies, such as a collapse due
to a heart attack.
In short, the benefits from the IoT vision are dependent on
wide-ranging, open information sharing.
If each ‘thing’s’ data is uploaded to the cloud and isolated
from other ‘things’, as is the case in current cloud offerings
(consideration 5), the policy-enforcing agent described has
no means of processing the data from multiple streams. To
enable such a service, the system would be architected to suit
some particular application; thus favouring the very “silos” that
preclude the wider vision.
We therefore have a requirement for both protection and
sharing, according to policy, whereas cloud designs so far
target strong protection without sharing.
There is ongoing research towards this. One approach being
investigated is Information Flow Control (IFC), where policy
is defined to manage, specify and control requirements for
isolation and data sharing and to enforce them as data flows
throughout a system [8]. IFC provides non-interference and
non-leakage guarantees. Our own work has demonstrated IFC
in a cloud context [36] to enforce data policy constraints
within and between cloud applications and services; where
flows are protected within an OS (at process level) [37] and
across machines [38]. Enforcement is end-to-end, where the
audit/provenance logs generated during IFC enforcement [37]
can be use to demonstrate that policy has been complied with,
whether user/application-specified, contractual or regulatory.
IFC could help reassure people that even though their
personal data has been uploaded to the cloud, it is protected
and shared as they specify. This is an important concept,
allowing users to retain control over their data, even when
it has left their hands. Other relevant research is in the area of
differential privacy and homomorphic encryption (see below),
that aim to protect raw data while acknowledging the need for
data sharing/processing.
The means by which tenants/users specify data sharing
policy is also a concern. This may be in the form of standard
templates, e.g. perhaps in line with service contracts, such as
a contract between an individual and their healthcare provider,
that can be adjusted to account for specific preferences [39].
Consideration 7: Encryption by ‘things’.
‘Things’, users and tenants could encrypt data before up-
loading to the cloud to: a) prevent the provider having access
to intelligible data; b) prevent the provider being forced to
disclose intelligible data to others, such as law enforcement
agencies; c) ensure protection against the provider leaking data,
due to misconfiguration, bugs, malicious insiders, etc.; d) deal
with differences in sensitivity for different data items; and/or
e) to protect data while in transit (specific data items c.f. the
entire channel as per consideration 1).
This approach results in the ‘things’ having to manage all
the security/data concerns, including key management which
can be complex, particularly when many principals (in an
IoT context, both users and ‘things’) are involved [21]. For
example, the data from a location sensor may be relevant to
a number of applications. Assuming the sensor data can be
encrypted before distribution, each time the set of authorised
applications changes, all keys must be revoked, and new keys
issued to all the relevant applications. This management burden
hinders scalability. Further, the issues concerning the resources
required for encryption, as discussed in consideration 1, are
also relevant.
Cloud providers offer a range of services, typically relat-
ing to storage, analytics, and processing. Limiting a cloud
provider’s access to data reduces the range of services they
can potentially offer. The wide-scale benefits of analytics over
big data, cross-silo processing, etc, generally require access to
intelligible data. Essentially, ‘thing’-encrypted data means that
the provider can offer no more than a storage/IaaS service (or
PaaS without any processing).
There is ongoing research into homomorphic encryption,
which enables computation to be performed on encrypted
data without access to plaintext [40], [41]; however, this is
currently far from practicable. Therefore for a provider to offer
processing services, it must either have access to the data in
intelligible form, or have access to decryption keys. In this
case, encryption protects only against inadvertent leakage, and
puts an onus on the provider to properly manage the keys.
In summary, ‘thing’ managed encryption should be used
with care since it may prevent the beneficial data composition
and sharing described above in consideration 6.
Consideration 8: Data combination. While advocating both
protection and beneficial sharing of ‘things’ data, as in the
examples above (considerations 4, 6), care should be taken
over sharing. In IoT, ‘things’ will act as data producers and
consumers, generating or processing data of various levels
of sensitivity. Some streams might be inherently sensitive,
e.g. a location sensor on a personal device, or a person’s
heart-rate sensor. However, even if individual data streams are
themselves benign, the application of data in combination can
raise serious privacy and security concerns [42]. Such problems
may be exacerbated by the use of cloud for IoT, as one of the
motivations for cloud uptake is explicitly to enable data to
be aggregated and used for a range of purposes, across the
range of ‘things’. Again, the motivation is to enable the wider,
more imaginative IoT vision, by having more data for more
accurate analysis, inferences, associations, personalisation and
customisation.
This concern relates to the tradeoff between the functional
benefits of combining data, and the danger of revealing poten-
tially sensitive information. From a privacy perspective: “Any
information that distinguishes one person from another can
be used for re-identifying anonymous data” [42]. There are
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technical approaches that can be used to limit the risks of data
combination. For example, differential privacy techniques [43]
aim at addressing the tradeoff by regulating the queries on
a dataset to balance the provision of useful results with the
probability of identifying individual records. Such techniques
are beginning to be offered by cloud providers [44]. Further, as
homomorphic encryption techniques (consideration 7) become
more practicable, more value can be leveraged from data with-
out access to the specifics. These techniques will contribute
towards facilitating the wide-scale information sharing vision.
Although the cloud acting as data aggregator adds a risk
of privacy violation through enabling richer datasets, and
entails highly trusted providers, it also restricts data access to
fewer places. This form of data “centralisation”, where data is
accessed through the cloud yet may be distributed throughout
the network, could enable aggregated, more focused data
management policy, applicable across datasets. That is, this
centralisation of data access means that such policy could ap-
ply more generally, accounting for data-combination concerns,
and be enforced through a common regime. This is in contrast
to the fragmented approach where such policy might apply
only within a particular IoT subsystem.
However, there is a more general problem in that it is
difficult to anticipate all possible information leaks that might
arise from combining data, and information sharing in general.
There is a clear need for some level of verifiable trust in the
parties with which data is shared, including those hosting data.
Note that although we discuss this issue in an IoT-Cloud
context, the concerns extend far beyond, raising questions for
society as a whole. Indeed, while there is much ongoing tech-
nical research into privacy in big data [45], the answers will not
be purely technical, but also require properly aligned economic
incentives, laws/regulation, and other social reforms [10].
V. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT
The management of identity becomes an interesting problem
for cloud-enabled IoT. In xIV we described how data is
managed, a key aspect of which involves access controls,
which tend to involve authentication and authorisation, see
consideration 2. In the cloud-enabled IoT context, we identify
two umbrella requirements with respect to identity manage-
ment: from the provider and ‘thing’ (tenant) perspectives.
Consideration 9: Identifying ‘things’. Identity management
has been the subject of much work in terms of current enter-
prise services. That is, there have been identity management
schemes, often single sign-on [46], [47], across cloud service
and application providers such as Microsoft Services, Google
Services, Facebook, etc. For example, consider identity feder-
ation technology such as Microsoft Passport and CardSpace,
Information Card, OpenID, Liberty Alliance, and Higgins [48].
However, all of these assume cloud services as they are
today. Users interact with the tenant’s application, and the
tenant is hosted by a cloud provider. Issues of identity concern
who interacts with the applications, and cloud resources.
The IoT brings additional considerations, as it involves more
than the well-defined tenant-software-provider relationship. In
IoT the provider could potentially receive the data of a number
of ‘things’, that belong to and/or produce data on a tenant/end
user. That is, an individual could have several hundred data
sources uploading to the provider. Some of these might go
through applications dedicated to them (in a similar manner
to today—which may simplify the problem); others might
be uploading to shared applications or directly to the cloud
platform. It follows that there must be a mechanism for
providers to determine to which tenants and/or end-users the
data streams belong.
The first step is to be able to identify the ‘things’, which
might be a new subsystem comprising a large number of
nodes [49]. There is work in the area, for example, having
an architecture that groups ‘things’ to enable the common
application of policy [50]. This is akin to an IoT subsystem, but
where the group exists purely for identity/policy management
purposes. Trusted Platform Modules [23], as mentioned in
consideration 2 may also assist.
After authentication, it must be possible to both specify and
identify to which tenant/user the ‘thing’ belongs. That is, there
must be suitably flexible, scalable identity mechanisms that tie
the ‘thing’ to the relevant tenant/user account. Authorisation
and other management policy is built on this.
A consideration is that some ‘things’ could a) be shared
and/or b) generate data that is relevant to a number of different
tenants. For example, home monitoring and control (domotic)
systems have user-specific policies, requiring people to be
identified. A proximity sensor in a house could identify when
different members of the family are near to it—there needs
to be some way of determining the context (e.g. relating
to which family member) in which the sensor is operating.
Each person might have different preferences and uses for
the data generated by the device. It may also be necessary to
temporarily account for ‘strangers’, such as visiting tradesman.
Issues are further complicated by actuators: knowing which
‘things’ to actuate, and when, to effect some change in the
physical environment. It becomes particularly important that
the right actions are triggered for the right person. Also, con-
flicts might arise, since physical changes can affect different
people, who might have different preferences. In the home
example, different members of the family may have different
temperature preferences, and thus policies over thermostat
control could conflict. In the case of simultaneous policies
applying and conflicting, detection and resolution mechanisms
are needed.
In the cloud there is an intrinsic tension between the end-
users’ requirement for privacy and the application providers’
economic interests (as the sayings goes: if you are not paying
for it, you’re not the customer; you’re the product being
sold.)6 While data is valuable, so too is identity since it can
ground various attributes and inferences, leading to targeted
advertising, changes in health premiums, and so forth [51].
These are general, identity-based concerns, based on identities
that exist in the real world (e.g. identifying an individual, group
of people (family) or business). However, even the identity of
‘things’ can release sensitive information. For instance, the fact
6This quote is generally attributed to Andrew Lewis: https://twitter.com/
andlewis/status/24380177712, (Accessed Apr 2015).
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that someone owns a particular device could imply they have
some medical condition [26].
From a human rights/legal point of view it has been argued
[52], [53] that IoT information should be considered as part
of an individual’s identity and protected in the same manner
as their physical identity. Cameron [54] defined seven funda-
mental laws for digital identities: user control and consent,
minimal disclosure for constrained use, justifiable parties,
directed identity, interoperability, human integration and con-
sistent experience across context.
Consideration 10: Identifying the provider. The inverse
consideration is that ‘things’ must interact with the correct
cloud service. Making sure the correct ‘thing’ (or the relevant
gateway component) sends the information to the right cloud
service a priori is typically a configuration issue, where fixed/
common configuration mechanisms are appropriate for some
situations; e.g. for the range of ‘things’ owned by the same
individual or business.
However, there are nuances. For example, if a ‘thing’
generates data relevant to multiple applications (hosted on
different cloud providers), how should the ‘thing’ know which
data to send where, and when? The ‘thing’ would need the
capability (credentials) to effect the relevant cloud interactions,
and maintain policy determining with which cloud services to
interact. Alternatively, this could be managed by the cloud
service, coordinating and distributing data across ‘things’,
applications, and clouds, but this requires shared resources that
can account for, and resolve policies of multiple actors.
Further, there will also be occasions when these concerns
will require runtime negotiation, e.g. when an individual first
interacts with a sensor. How do they transfer their policies,
and dictate where that data should flow? How should it
be managed? These are complex issues all of which need
consideration.
VI. MANAGING SCALE FOR THE IOT-CLOUD
Cloud services exist to exploit economies of scale. A key
offering of the cloud is elasticity, where resources can be
rapidly scaled up or down in response to changes in demand.
This functionality is highly attractive to tenants, as it allows for
cost-effective improvements in application/service availability.
Consideration 11: Increase in load. Traditionally, the elastic-
ity of cloud services was aimed at resourcing web applications,
where an ‘end-user’ represents a thread or instance of a web-
application. In the IoT space, there is a vast increase not only
in the number of clients (i.e. ‘things’) that the cloud must
interact with, but also in terms of data volume, velocity and
variety [55]. Cloud services must therefore be able to manage
a range and scale of devices that potentially produce data
far in excess of today’s volume and peak loads. The failure
to scale leads to availability issues, which can have serious
implications by limiting access to data or preventing the cloud
from coordinating and mediating the ‘things’.
Scale represents a real challenge. We currently see that cloud
enabled applications are often unable to rely on elasticity alone
to deal with periods of extreme demand even in a web context,
e.g. many clients attempting to book popular event tickets at
the moment of release [56]. In such situations, other techniques
(e.g. queueing systems and/or customised architectures) need
to be employed to manage such loads. For IoT, issues of
managing at such scale could well be the norm.
It is also important to account for any performance overhead
brought by the security mechanisms.
Consideration 12: Logging at large scale. Logs are im-
portant for ensuring that systems are functioning as expected,
and for demonstrating compliance with regulations, laws and
contracts (see xIX).
Since many more ‘things’ may be interacting with cloud
services, logging and audit suffer from problems of scale. This
is from a number of perspectives: in terms of what the cloud
provider must record; the fact that logs might be decentralised
amongst the ‘things’; that different systems/verticals will vary
in what is (and needs to be) recorded; and what can sensibly
be interpreted from log data, which may be large, federated,
and potentially in different formats. In such a context, it makes
some sense to push the log data from ‘things’ to the cloud,
to provide a better overview of state, but this will necessarily
incur cost, in terms of processing, storage and transmission.
It becomes important to be able to define policy that captures
the audit goals or the legal requirements through the different
layers of the cloud stack, while minimising the amount of data
captured to acquire the relevant information [57]. However,
most of the logs available in the cloud are an aggregation of the
logs of various cloud components, coming from webservers,
the OS, databases etc. These logs are system-centric. In terms
of the wider IoT vision, tenants and users will also require logs
pertaining to their data, not just system status. Thus, logging
mechanisms must evolve to capture information in a more data-
centric fashion [58].
Another consideration is managing the location of log
information across the range of ‘things’. One approach is to
centralise log information, e.g. [59] proposes an approach to
reliably collect logs from various sources, removing duplicate/
unnecessary information, while accounting for failure or dis-
connections. Such an approach seems highly suited to cloud
service. The alternative is to develop analysis tools that can
work over decentralised log data [60]. This shows promise as
it accounts for the coordination and ad hoc aspects of IoT.
Perhaps a hybrid approach is sensible.
There is also the tension between the volume of log informa-
tion and the associated storage and processing overheads. To-
wards this, work includes dynamically modifying the verbosity
of the log when there is a potential threat [61], or a posteriori
editing of the log to remove unnecessary information [62].
In general, log analysis in large complex distributed systems
still presents many unsolved challenges [61]. Certainly, more
work is needed in addressing such issues in the context of an
IoT-Cloud.
VII. MALICIOUS THINGS
The previous sections broadly consider aspects of manage-
ment. As mentioned (see xIV), cloud providers already protect
their infrastructure from a range of different attacks, through
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having appropriate access controls, isolation, encryption and
sanitisation functionality (for PaaS/SaaS), etc. To reiterate,
cloud providers have clear incentives to maintain a secure
infrastructure, because a) their business model depends on
sharing infrastructure, and b) failure to provide adequate
security measures will result in negative publicity and thus
a loss in reputation and business.
Given our focus on IoT-Cloud, we do not explore the
protection measures that apply to cloud-computing services
in general; [63] and [64] provide overviews. Note also that
any security mechanisms developed to address the IoT-Cloud
security considerations we raise, may be subjected to attack.
However, such attacks would be solution-specific, thus any
analysis would only be relevant within the context of the
specific approach and implementation. Therefore, in this
section we focus on two situations, specific to cloud-enabled
IoT, where the attacks come from malicious (or compromised)
‘things’. This is a real concern; for instance, a wide variety of
smart home appliances have been discovered to be the source
of large-scale spam attacks.7
Consideration 13: Malicious ‘things’—protection of
provider. The cloud provider will maintain various access,
and other controls, to protect against specific attacks, e.g. a
rogue ‘thing’ attempting to exploit the service, perhaps through
some sort of injection attack. Even if attacks are successful,
cloud isolation mechanisms offer containment, limiting their
fallout. Such attacks are not unlike the security concerns of
the cloud as it is today.
Previous sections have explored how IoT dramatically in-
creases scale, where there is the potential for a vast number
of ‘things’ to interact directly with a provider. Thus one
clear IoT-Cloud vulnerability is cloud denial of service (DoS),
which could potentially be launched from a large number of
compromised ‘things’. Cloud services are naturally elastic,
designed to rapidly scale up/down resources in response to
increases in demand, but still remain vulnerable to DoS [56].
Therefore, there is a need to explore more advanced DoS
techniques in light of the fact that IoT greatly increases the
scope of such an attack, particularly as ‘things’ become more
integrated with cloud services.
Consideration 14: Malicious ‘things’—protection of others.
Since the cloud can operate as a mediator and coordinator
between ‘things’, it offers potential in terms of improving
security across the IoT ecosystem. This is because the cloud
provides a natural “choke-point” between ‘things’, in which
security policy can be implemented and enforced.8
Requiring input data to pass through a validation process
allows the cloud to effectively disconnect (or ignore inputs
from) ‘things’ that are detected as compromised. This also
helps ensure data integrity, as only valid data (in terms of
rate/format)—rather than that from a faulty, compromised
7http://investors.proofpoint.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=819799,
(Accessed Apr 2015).
8Of course, things may also interact directly, without the use of cloud
services. But architectures and services could leverage cloud-based protection
capabilities when/where appropriate to limit the scope of attacks, even if the
cloud does not mediate every interaction between ‘things’. See also xX.
(rogue), or inappropriate (but perhaps non-malicious) ‘thing’—
can enter a (possibly shared) database or flow to others via
the cloud. Further, there is scope for the cloud to be used
more proactively, for example, by issuing control messages to
‘things’ to turn them off (or adjust some parameters) where
necessary, or perhaps to trigger software/firmware updates.
Warnings could also be issued to alert those that own, use
or rely on those ‘things’ that are determined to be faulty or
compromised. These could be high-level (human-readable) or
low-level (in a machine-to-machine context), as appropriate.
A fundamental consideration is in determining the ‘things’
that have been compromised. This will be relevant at dif-
ferent levels, depending on the circumstances; for instance,
approaches could involve determining the malicious or untrust-
worthy nodes in a network [65], analysing the data outputs,
patterns of behaviour or reputation of a ‘thing’ [66], or perhaps
involve human intervention, e.g. reporting a device as stolen.
Work will be required on developing such techniques, in line
with new developments in technologies and their uses.
VIII. TRUST IN THE CLOUD PROVIDER: CERTIFICATION
Any prospective tenant, before committing to the use of
cloud services, needs to consider the trustworthiness of the
provider. This has many dimensions, as discussed throughout
this paper. Here we focus on aspects of certification—what
should be certified and how? xIX extends this discussion to
the demonstration of compliance with regulations and laws.
Consideration 15: Certification of cloud service providers.
Certification can be about system configuration, and the associ-
ated management processes (particularly management of risk),
both at a human level (e.g. engineer involvement, regulating
physical access) and a more technical level (e.g. whether
security standards are adhered to). A number of regulated
sectors, such as in Government and health, may only use cloud
service offerings that are certified as being compliant across the
relevant regulatory landscape, UK’s G-Cloud,9 and in the US
FedRAMP10 and HIPAA,11 being representative. Even those
operating in less regulated sectors will have an interest in their
provider demonstrating compliance with various standards,
such as ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [67] on information security, to
provide a degree of assurance.
Currently, certification is often the only available way to
demonstrate compliance with regulations [68]. The automating
of certification processes has been considered [69]–[71], but
certification is currently a human-centred process that assesses
system behaviour at the time of the audit. Any changes to
a deployment can trigger the need for recertification, which
is often a timely and costly process. Further, the advent
or installation of new technology or architecture needs to
go through a certification process, thus introducing similar
inefficiencies. Overall such constraints do not align to the
general, flexible vision of the cloud, let alone IoT-Cloud.
9https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
g-cloud-security-accreditation-application, (Accessed Apr 2015).
10http://cloud.cio.gov/fedramp, (Accessed Apr 2015).
11http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy, (Accessed Apr 2015).
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It may be possible to formalise some aspects of compliance,
for example with regard to some aspects of security [72], [73];
however, such work explicitly recognises the difficulties given
the lack of cloud provider transparency. Another issue concerns
service composition, in the sense that even if two systems
are individually secure, the composition of the services may
not be [73]. This is particularly relevant in a cloud context,
where cloud services may be composed (see consideration 18).
Further, if the cloud operates as a coordinator of ‘things’,
then the provider may bear extra responsibility to ensure such
coordinations are appropriate, e.g. in terms of data combination
(see consideration 8).
Therefore, more technical means of defining the appropriate
cloud-provider behaviour and demonstrating compliance is
needed, as discussed in the rest of this section and in xIX.
Consideration 16: Trustworthiness of cloud services. A
general concern is how much trust can be placed in a cloud
service provider; that is, that they will properly i) secure
their service, ii) ensure it is correctly configured, iii) report
leakages/issues, iv) use data only for their intended purposes.
Key to building trust is providing some degree of visibil-
ity/transparency over the cloud service. xIX discusses how
this might be enhanced through audit, including when using
external, third-party cloud services and controlling where data
is located in order to abide by regulations.
Recent developments in hardware technologies [74] enable
new levels of trust, providing Trusted Platform Modules (TPM)
[23] and remote attestation for cloud computing [75]. These
can work to increase the level of trust that tenants have
in the provider; for instance by enabling data integrity and
confidentially to be guaranteed regardless of the platform on
which the data is processed [76], or to provide guarantees
concerning the physical location of data [77] (see consideration
19). Such techniques are reaching maturity, e.g. IBM is rolling
out a scalable TPM-based cloud platform [75], [78].
It is often the case that end-users are more willing to
trust well-established and known cloud providers, rather than
those with little history or reputation, such as startups offering
cloud-hosted applications. Several projects have focused on
preventing the misuse or leakage of data by cloud applications
through complex isolation mechanisms [79], or by incorpo-
rating Information Flow Control (IFC) [37], [80] (see con-
sideration 6), which enables the control policy to be attached
to data (potentially by ‘things’, tenants or providers) in order
to control the flow of data, and to generate audit logs. More
generally, having mechanisms that limit data mismanagement
are crucial to enabling the wide-scale vision of information
sharing underpinning the IoT.
IX. PROVIDER TRANSPARENCY: COMPLIANCE
Some data management constraints arise from the nature
and functionality of the applications and services. Others are
a result of regulation (e.g. data protection legislation) and
contractual obligation (e.g. service-level agreements). Rather
than the cloud-provider being a ‘black-box’, in both situations
it is advantageous to have some visibility into a provider’s
operations, be it for compliance purposes, or more generally,
to give some some surety that data is properly managed.
For all the considerations in this section, the concerns will
become particularly pertinent for the IoT-Cloud, given it entails
a vast increase in data producers, consumers, and service
providers; where data and services may be used/reused for
a number of purposes.
Consideration 17: Demonstrating compliance using audit.
Cloud service providers issue contracts indicating the terms
and conditions of cloud tenants’ usage, i.e. service-level agree-
ments (SLA). There is currently often little or no provision for
negotiation of the service conditions [29], nor any automated
means of demonstrating compliance with all the terms within
a contract. More generally, tenants may have obligations with
respect to data management; e.g. data protection regulations in
the EU apply to data considered personal [29].
Trustworthy audit services are relevant for cloud tenants,
end-users and providers. Tenants and users can be assured that
the platform is performing as it should be (and that they are
getting what they pay for), and for providers such services
help detect data leaks, misconfigurations and other security
issues. Audit is also relevant for verifying compliance with
law/regulation [81]. Clearly, such information helps reinforce
accountability [82], be it to show some fault of the provider, or
conversely to absolve their responsibility, when a leak has been
claimed falsely. Further, such data would also be useful more
generally, e.g. by public-sector bodies charged with advising
on and enforcing information-related policy (such as the UK
Information Commissioner’s Office).
The recent surge in cloud uptake, and the evolving IoT
market has meant there is beginning to be some work on
audit. For example, Massonet et al. [83] propose a framework
whereby a cloud provider generates an audit log so that
the cloud tenant is able to demonstrate his compliance with
location-related regulation, and in an IoT context, the Infineon
Trusted Platform Module12 uses hardware-based cryptography
to produce tamper-proof audit logs. It is important that audit
mechanisms are developed, not only to handle the scale of
the IoT vision (xVI), but also to ensure that all relevant
aspects are captured, and that access to audit information is
properly regulated (log data can be sensitive). All of these pose
challenges, given the way IoT services are composed, where
data (and services) can be used/reused for different purposes.
Consideration 18: Responsibility for composite services. It
is common for cloud service providers to leverage a number of
third-party services. Other cloud platforms could be involved
in service provision, for example, building a PaaS offering
over IaaS provider, as is the case for Heroku PaaS that runs
over Amazon IaaS, providing the feature set for tenants to
build SaaS applications.13 Other third-party services, may also
be involved such as those providing log archiving and analytic
tools. It follows that the legal obligations between tenants, end-
users, providers, and the providers’ entire supply chain can be
12https://www.infineon.com/cms/en/applications/chip-card-security/
internet-of-things-security/audit-and-accountability, (Accessed Apr 2015)
13See https://www.heroku.com/customers, (Accessed Apr 2015) for a list of
commercial entities already running over such services.
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unclear [84]. Policies related to data location (see consideration
19) may be relevant, in addition to the more general concern
of who has access to data.
Some recent work is addressing these concerns, for example,
Henze et al. [85] propose an annotation, audit and negotiation
system for multi-party layered cloud offering (SaaS, PaaS and
IaaS) to meet tenant specified requirements. However, such
issues become even more complex in an IoT context, where
services will be composed more dynamically.
As an initial step forward, more transparency and visibil-
ity as to the specifics of how cloud services are composed
and provisioned would assist in determining the appropriate
responsibility and regulation frameworks, to which technical
composition mechanisms can aspire.
A further consideration is application level composition.
That is, where ‘things’, including those cloud based, are
brought together by application/user-level concerns; particu-
larly where it is the composition itself that brings about a
vulnerability. In this context, issues concerning policy au-
thoring, validation and conflict resolution are relevant; for
details see [86], consideration 2, and [27] for a practical
illustration involving a lighting system, IFTT14 and Facebook.
The possibility for dynamic, perhaps unforeseen compositions
raises interesting risk and obligation management challenges.
Consideration 19: Compliance with data location regula-
tions. The broad IoT vision is for ‘things’ to interact, wherever
they are, when and where appropriate. There are, however, real
concerns relating to the physical (geo)location of data.
This issue is less apparent when considering ‘things’ in
isolation, as ‘things’ tend naturally to be grounded in some
physical environment, space (e.g. sensor networks in a build-
ing or city) or coupled with an individual (e.g. a mobile
phone). Cloud services, however, deliberately aim to be glob-
ally centralised [87], generally accessible from anywhere and
everywhere. Thus, in mediating between ‘things’, the nature
of cloud provisioning means that data could potentially be
moved and stored, and ‘things’ orchestrated and controlled,
across geographic boundaries. There are practical concerns,
most obviously in terms of law, when data (or control) flows
span national borders.
As a result, we have seen much political rhetoric calling
for regional clouds (such as a Europe-only cloud), particularly
post-Snowden, in an attempt to circumvent various Govern-
mental agencies and for competitive advantage—see [84] for
a full analysis of the related societal issues. Practically, laws
and best practices that constrain data-flows based on geography
are an attempt to give certainty and visibility as to the legal
regime and management principles that apply to data. We have
explored the technical considerations of constraining data by
location for legal purposes in [10], [88].
Hybrid-clouds are marketed as a solution, where data
with location-based constraints remains on the tenant’s self-
managed infrastructure. While this addresses issues of location,
this can be costly and limits the wider benefits of the cloud.
Further, they hinder the flexible sharing underpinning the wider
vision of IoT (consideration 4).
14https://ifttt.com, (Accessed Apr 2015).
It is apparent that more control mechanisms are needed to
address the fact that ‘things’ are local, but the cloud-based
data services and analytics are potentially global. We raise this
issue here as it represents a real, practical hurdle that must be
overcome in order to realise wider IoT vision.
X. DECENTRALISED CLOUDS: A FUTURE TREND
Our discussion so far has concerned the cloud of to-
day, where the cloud in effect represents—from the tenant
perspective—a global, but centralised infrastructure [87]. This
is our focus as it represents the current state of the art, which
is already beginning to be used to support IoT and big data
applications.
Moving forward, however, there is ongoing research into
decentralised cloud computing. In general terms, this involves
pushing the cloud services towards the edges of the network,
towards and closer to the ‘things’. Key motivations of such
research are to reduce the latency, delay, jitter, network con-
gestion, and resource usage that naturally arise from local/
mobile ‘things’ interacting with the global centralised cloud.
Work on decentralisation is not considered a replacement for
the global cloud—which will still have a place as aggregator,
coordinator and a pool of resources—but rather represents the
means to better deal with the challenges associated with the
local (‘thing’)-global interplay.
There are differences among the proposed approaches. Fog
computing [87], [89] describes more of a distributed compu-
tation approach, akin to edge [90] or grid computing, where
certain service functionality is composed from among ‘things’
and cloud services, at various levels, data flowing where
appropriate (e.g. pre/post computation). Cloudlets [91] are
concerned with mobile cloud computing, where personal VMs
(e.g. stored on mobile devices) can be offloaded onto more
fixed infrastructure in the environment, e.g. that situated in
a cafe or shopping mall, in order to leverage general cloud
resources, when possible. This is to bring various efficiencies
over the device acting either by itself or in conjunction with
the more distant global cloud. Droplets [92] enable similar ca-
pabilities, but focus specifically on small, well-defined, highly
customised virtual machines (unikernels [93]), that can enable
personal- or even application/service-specific clouds. As well
as efficiency, an explicit design goal of droplets is to enable
a user to be in control of their personal data and services: an
individual could precisely define the functionality and content
of each droplet, and decide when/where and by whom each
droplet is hosted.
Consideration 20: Impact of cloud decentralisation on
security. The concept of the decentralised cloud raises in-
teresting security considerations. It could reduce the attack
surface of the global cloud, and perhaps the vulnerability
to DoS, because fewer ‘things’ would directly interact with
remote cloud services.
Conversely, the smaller, decentralised entities are likely to
be less robust, e.g. in terms of the security mechanisms that
can be applied, and more vulnerable to DoS, due to the lack of
resource elasticity. Further, decentralisation paves the way for
more targeted attacks, e.g. directed towards an individual c.f.
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TABLE I. CONSIDERATIONS, SECURITY FOCUS (C=CONFIDENTIALITY, I=INTEGRITY, A=AVAILABILITY) AND CURRENT STATUS (GREEN=SOME
MATURITY IN APPROACHES; AMBER=SOME RESEARCH EXISTS, MORE WORK NEEDED; RED=RELATIVELY UNEXPLORED AREA)
# Consideration Focus Status
1 Secure communications C, I Work is advanced and existing techniques can be leveraged. IoT could benefit from lighter-weight schemes,
particularly where cryptography is involved.
2 Access controls for IoT-Cloud C Standard mechanisms can be used. IoT adds complexity due to the scale and dynamism of ‘thing’ access.
3 Identifying sensitive data C Largely a non-technical concern, but has an impact on how policies are defined.
4 Public, private or hybrid? C, A Currently blunt partitioning is supported, but emerging research will allow for more flexible deployments that
facilitate data sharing.
5 In-cloud data protection C There are strong isolation techniques available and providers employ general access controls. More flexible
approaches are needed for inter-application sharing to be possible (see 6, below).
6 In-cloud data sharing C, A Inter-application sharing is needed for IoT but currently is not part of the cloud philosophy.
7 Encryption by ‘things’ C, I Encryption techniques are mature, but this approach precludes most computations on protected data and involves
complex key management. Ongoing work into homomorphic encryption will assist. Work on lightweight encryption
mechanisms are being developed and will therefore require robust testing and analysis.
8 Data combination C Some techniques exist to prevent user re-identification, but much more work is needed.
9 Identifying ‘things’ C Existing work on identity management can be leveraged for IoT, but more experience at a larger scale is needed
to determine suitability and/or limitations.
10 Identifying the provider C The basic issues are mostly architectural or configuration concerns. Some outstanding issues remain when resources
are shared or where decisions need to be made at runtime.
11 Increase in interactions and data load A Cloud services manage elasticity well, but resource expansion is not unlimited. Peak IoT loads are unknown, but
possibly controlled by economics (payment/ownership).
12 Logging at large scale C, I, A Currently logging is low-level and system-centered. More work is needed on logging and processing tools for
applications and users.
13 Malicious ‘things’—protection of provider C, I, A Existing techniques can be deployed.
14 Malicious ‘things’—protection of others C, I, A There are potentially techniques that can assist. Experience is needed of cloud services operating across IoT
subsystems.
15 Certification of cloud service providers C, I, A This is currently manual and static, leading to delays when updates are required. Research is needed on automatic
certification processes, possibly including hardware-based solutions.
16 Trustworthiness of cloud services C, I, A An emerging field with ongoing research. Experience of practical implementation is needed.
17 Demonstrating compliance using audit C, I, A Currently, the compliance of cloud providers to their contractual obligations is not demonstrated convincingly.
Research is needed, and IoT will add additional complexity.
18 Responsibility for composite services C, I, A The legal implications of the use of third-party and other services are unresolved. Such usage is not as yet
transparent to tenants and/clients. More work is needed concerning user and application-level policy aspects.
19 Compliance with data location regulations C, I, A Currently not enforceable except at coarse granularity. There is research in IFC that can assist, but the concepts
are not yet commercially deployed.
20 Impact of cloud decentralisation C, I, A This is an emerging field, where the current focus is on functionality. More attention is needed regarding security.
the global cloud provider; and the data flows moving in/out
of the more controlled, global cloud infrastructure will occur
more frequently, thus raising additional management concerns.
Coordinating security mechanisms, such as software updates
and security patches, and identity management present real
challenges in highly federated environments. Depending on
how decentralised clouds come to be realised, ‘things’ possibly
may become more embedded within the cloud service, which
could increase the severity of an attack.
More generally, as the systems environment becomes decen-
tralised, it may be the case that more ‘things’ directly interact,
rather than rely on cloud-services—particularly as ‘things’
become more powerful. Such interactions require the means
for flexible management. There is work on infrastructure
towards this, such as SBUS [94]: a decentralised, peer-to-peer
based communications infrastructure that aims at policy-driven
interactions. Such functionality appears useful in managing
all combinations of ‘things’ interacting with other ‘things’,
‘things’ with clouds, and clouds with clouds.
XI. SUMMARY
Concern over data security in cloud computing is already
seen as inhibiting the adoption of public cloud services for a
number of sectors and organisations [31]. Legal and regulatory
issues are also emerging, concerning the location of data and
identifying the jurisdictions under which they fall [84].
With this background, we have considered the use of cloud
technology for IoT, to reduce the propensity for application
“silos” and enable the beneficial sharing of data. Cloud
services can clearly hold and process the data of ‘things’, and
components that manage ‘things’ and combine data streams
from ‘things’ are highly amenable to being hosted within
the cloud. Cloud and IoT potentially present vast scope for
considering security. In this paper we have identified and
described twenty security-related considerations within the
following broad range of concerns:
 Issues of data transport to/from cloud services and data
management in the cloud (xIII, xIV).
 Issues associated with identity management (xV).
 Issues associated with the scale of IoT (xVI).
 Issues arising from malicious ‘things’ (xVII).
 Issues of certification, trust and compliance with
regulations and contractual obligations (xVIII, xIX).
 Issues arising from further decentralisation into multiple
clouds, fog services, etc. (xX).
Table I lists these twenty considerations, indicating where
current, standard existing technologies can be used (green),
where more work is required but the problems are reasonably
INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, IEEE 14
well understood (amber), and where significant research is
needed to understand and solve the problems (red).
We see data sharing as an intrinsic part of the IoT phi-
losophy, yielding many benefits. Of course, sharing must
be controlled according to policy, which must be informed
by the possible consequences of unconsidered data sharing.
Cloud services have been designed with protection (isolation)
as the dominant concern, with far less consideration given
to sharing. A promising approach to providing both data
protection and sharing is to augment principal-centered access
control technologies with those that focus on the properties of
the data. Information Flow Control, for instance, can prevent
data leakage while relaxing the strong isolation that currently
prevents data sharing between applications [8], [37]. Only
if controlled data sharing can be supported by public cloud
services can the wider IoT-vision be realised.
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